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1.  Introduction 
In theory, banks are considered as financial intermediaries in a narrow sense because they 
provide qualitative asset transformation (QAT) which comprises lot size, maturity, and risk 
transformation (see, for example, Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Allen and Santomero 
(1998)). Banks typically take deposits from surplus units (households) and lend money to 
deficit units (firms) which is known as commercial banking. In this paper, we take a new look 
at the evolution of bank funding modes over time, in particular at deposit taking being 
mutually with lending the core of commercial banking. Additionally, the implications of 
potential changes within the liability structure of banks for lending and profitability are 
analyzed. 
Traditional approaches of banking theory argue that the above quoted transformation 
functions can serve as a rationale for the existence of banks because intermediation helps to 
lower transaction costs (see Gurley and Shaw (1960), Benston and Smith (1976)). Modern 
theory of financial intermediation explains the existence of intermediaries as an improvement 
of welfare due to a reduction in costs of asymmetric information. Some of these models focus 
on lending (see, for example, Diamond (1984)) while others derive the existence of banks 
from deposit taking (see, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). More recent empirical 
work establishes a link between relationship lending and a special form of deposits (see Berlin 
and Mester (1999)): „banks’ access to core deposits has been one of the foundations of 
relationship lending.“ Other studies offer explanations that are based on synergies between 
lending and deposit taking. 
In practice, financial intermediaries have been subject to considerable changes during the 
past two decades and there has been discussion about the future of banks (see Boyd and 
Gertler (1995), Allen and Santomero (2001), Bossone (2001)). In addition to globalization, 
liberalization and consolidation phenomena like securitization and disintermediation have 
appeared. In general, securitization refers to the creation of financial contracts that assume the 
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form of securities. Particularly in recent years, securitization describes a new financial 
engineering technique: the transformation of illiquid assets into marketable securities (asset 
backed securities). Disintermediation generally stands for a decrease in contracting with 
intermediaries, thus may affect both the lending and deposit taking of banks. Edwards and 
Mishkin (1995) see a global trend: „As a source of funds for financial intermediaries, 
deposits have steadily diminished in importance. [...] we can expect a diminished role for 
traditional banking in these [other] countries as well.“ These developments indicate that 
financial intermediation services seem to be subject to substantial changes. Surprisingly, 
besides general tendency statements there is relatively little empirical evidence for the extent 
and shape of these developments (see, for example, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell (1999)). 
Recently, Hackethal (2004) concludes that the structurally declining role of deposits 
represents a future critical issue as deposits were the most important funding source of 
German banks in the past and contributed significantly to their net interest income: one „issue 
relates directly to the core deposits [...]. Should the trend of disintermediation on the banks 
liability sides continue, savings banks will probably lose a competitive advantage ...” 
Interestingly, an examination of aggregate bank data from the 30 OECD countries over the 
past 25 years reveals that in some countries deposits (relative to total bank assets) have 
steadily lost ground (Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland) while they have 
been stable (Australia, Japan, Netherlands, United States of America) or even slightly gaining 
in importance (France, Belgium, Poland, Hungary) in others. The evolution of deposits is 
more or less ambiguous in the remaining countries. 
These developments raise several questions that relate to the nature of deposit taking. 
First, given that deposits constitute the major funding mode of banks in many countries, what 
happens if banks are no longer able to mobilize a sufficient volume of deposits? Can they 
close the funding gap by alternative refinancing instruments or should we expect a negative 
impact on the lending business? Note that this problem is still relevant if disintermediation in 
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absolute terms (i.e. a decline in deposits) does not occur because it is sufficient that deposits 
grow at a smaller rate than the lending volume. Second, if banks cannot substitute the funding 
gap through other liabilities, do they rely on asset securitization as an innovative funding 
mode? Banks may remain specialists in loan origination but suffer from funding problems. In 
that case, they can pool parts of their loan portfolio and sell them to the market as asset 
backed securities. Third, from a theoretical standpoint the economic function of deposits 
should matter. Customers hold bank deposits for payment purposes on the one hand and for 
saving purposes on the other hand. Does the specialness of banks relate more to the payment 
function than to the saving function? Fourth, what is the impact of bank mergers and 
acquisitions on deposit taking? Are larger banks less able to mobilize deposits than smaller 
banks? Fifth, is there a link between the size of a bank’s branch network and its ability to 
mobilize deposits? Finally, if banks increasingly substitute deposits from customers by 
interbank liabilities, can we conclude that systemic risk in the banking sector increases? 
 In the light of these questions, we analyze the evolution of the funding structure of 
German banks and its consequences over the course of the decade 1992-2002. Germany, 
constituting the country with the world’s second largest banking system in terms of total 
assets as of year-end 2001 (after the United States and slightly before Japan), represents an 
interesting object of investigation for the following reasons: it provides a typical example for 
a bank-based financial system and, more importantly, the banks heavily rely on deposits as a 
funding mode. In addition, due to the recently published FSAP report by the International 
Monetary Fund a new debate on the future of Germany’s three-pillar banking system has 
started (see Brunner et al. (2004)). Note that the diversity due to the three-pillar system offers 
the opportunity to study funding modes of a wide range of different banks (large vs. small, 
privately-owned vs. publicly-owned etc.). To our knowledge, this is the first paper that 
analyzes deposit taking of banks not only with aggregate but also with bank-level data. 
Specifically, we address the following three issues: 
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• How can we characterize the evolution of deposits taken by German banks? 
• What is the relationship between deposits from customers and other funding 
modes? 
• What is the impact of potential changes of the liability structure on the asset 
structure and bank profitability? 
Note that we do not attempt to test for factors that determine the evolution of deposits because 
these factors are predominantly macro-economic ones (see Deutsche Bundesbank (2003)). 
Instead, we take the evolution as given and examine its consequences at the bank-level. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
related research on the role of deposits in banking. Section 3 summarizes institutional 
characteristics of the German banking sector and presents summary statistics. In section 4, we 
test a set of hypotheses on the relationship between the evolution of deposits and other 
funding modes, the lending business and bank performance using panel data from all German 
banks provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Research on the role of deposits in banking 
In this section, we consider two strands of literature that both deal with deposits in 
banking. Firstly, we review related research that examines banking systems from a macro 
perspective. Secondly, we turn to selected theoretical and empirical studies from the field of 
financial intermediation which usually take a micro perspective. 
Merton (1995) proposes that the analysis of financial systems should distinguish between 
a functional and an institutional perspective.1 Essentially, there are various functions that may 
be executed by different kind of institutions. While functions are independent from the 
institutional setting, the latter may evolve over time incorporating or abandoning various 
                                                 
1 See Schmidt and Tyrell (2004) with an overview of approaches to analyzing financial systems. They 
distinguish between the institutional, intermediation, functional and systemic approach. 
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functions. In the context of deposits, following Merton’s approach means to examine the 
evolution of various kinds of deposits and depository institutions as well as the evolution of 
the underlying economic functions. 
Moreover, research on financial systems distinguishes between market-based and bank-
based financial systems. Whereas the United States and the United Kingdom are commonly 
considered as market-based systems, Japan and Germany are seen as examples for bank-based 
systems (see Allen and Gale (2000), Krahnen and Schmidt (2004)). In this context, “bank-
based” means that universal and/or commercial banks play a dominant role in the 
intermediation process of an economy. Intermediaries in bank-based financial systems 
typically perform QAT by means of deposit taking and lending. Levine (2002) provides a 
large-scale cross-country analysis of financial systems. His main result is that the financial 
development is strongly linked with the economic growth of a country. However, this study 
finds no support for either the bank-based or capital-market based views of financial systems. 
In some countries, especially in the United States, tendencies towards disintermediation 
and securitization seem to render QAT less important (see, for example, Edwards and 
Mishkin (1995), Miller (1998)). However, there has been doubt in reference to a general 
decline in commercial banking (see Boyd and Gertler (1995), Rajan (1996), Schmidt, 
Hackethal, and Tyrell (1999), Hackethal (2004)). The ongoing dynamics have been 
interpreted as a change in banking towards off-balance sheet and fee-income business rather 
than a decline. In other countries, for example United Kingdom and Germany, evidence is 
mixed. Domanski (1997) follows Merton (1995) and analyzes aggregate data for the German 
financial system during 1970-1995. He identifies a trend of disintermediation on the liability 
side of bank balance-sheets. The relative importance of deposits from customers declines 
while the lending business does not decrease in relative terms. 
Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell (1999) investigate whether there is a trend towards 
disintermediation and securitization in Germany, France and the United Kingdom during the 
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period 1982-1996. By measuring both effects by means of intermediation and securitization 
ratios between the economic sectors within a country they obtain the following results. First, 
by means of intermediation ratios they find a trend towards disintermediation in France but 
not in Germany and the UK. Second, in all three countries securitization increases. Third, 
consistent with Domanski (1997), they show that the ability of banks to mobilize deposits 
from customers declines because the intermediation chain has been lengthened by mutual 
funds. Interestingly, banks seem to specialize in lending while other non-bank financial 
intermediaries specialize in providing investment products. 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2003) provides an overview of the aggregate development of bank 
deposits in Germany. In the 1990s, deposits have grown at a slower rate than in the 1980s. A 
cointegration analysis of quarterly data from the period 1980-2002 is carried out to test 
determinants of deposit growth. The analysis reveals that the level of deposits is positively 
associated with the level of the real GDP and negatively associated with the ten year-level of 
interest rates. During 2001 and 2002, however, deposit growth sharply increases and lies 
considerably above its long-term estimates. This finding is explained by portfolio effects that 
are a consequence of the ongoing stock market baisse and Germany’s entry into stage three of 
the monetary union. 
The second strand of related literature consists of theoretical and empirical studies from 
the field of financial intermediation where bank behavior is frequently analyzed at the 
individual level. Early theoretical work emphasizes the beneficial implications of banks being 
exposed to runs (see, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Calomiris and Kahn (1990)). 
More recently, Boot and Thakor (2000) develop a model about competition within the 
banking sector and competition between banks and capital markets in order to make 
predictions for different kinds of lending (relationship lending, transaction lending, and 
capital market lending). The following assumptions are made to characterize commercial 
banks: they provide QAT and benefit from deposit insurance, deposit supply depends on the 
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availability of deposits in its operating area, bank branches provide access to deposits, and 
expected costs of deposits are the riskless rate plus an add-on reflecting the cost of bank 
regulations. 
Empirical work that analyzes the deposit taking role of banks is relatively scarce. Berlin 
and Mester (1999) examine the link between a special type of deposits, called “core deposits”, 
and relationship lending. They find that access to core deposits with inelastic interest rates 
insulate a bank’s cost of funds from exogenous shocks. This effect, in turn, can protect 
borrowers against unexpected increases in loan rates as a part of an implicit relationship. In 
their conclusion, they mention that the declining demand for deposits may not only raise 
banks’ funding costs but also reduce the feasibility of relationship lending. 
Another rationale that integrates the asset and liability side of banks goes back to Black 
(1975), Fama (1985), and Nakamura (1993). Small banks primarily lend money to small and 
medium firms and simultaneously offer checking accounts with payment services. Therefore, 
these banks permanently acquire information about incoming and outgoing payments of their 
borrowers. This information may be useful for monitoring these borrowers as it reveals a 
large part of their business (checking account hypothesis). An empirical investigation of 
Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2003) provides support for this hypothesis. 
Rajan (1996) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) offer an alternative explanation for 
the existence of banks. They interpret the deposit and the lending business as two sides of one 
function: the provision of liquidity on demand. Banks can benefit from synergies if deposit 
withdrawals and the usage of loan commitments are imperfectly correlated because both 
activities can share the costs of holding liquid assets.  
Finally, taking an institutional view, Allen and Parwada (2002) ask whether bank deposits 
and managed funds (mutual funds, investment funds) are close substitutes. Analyzing data 
from Australian banks and bank-affiliated funds, they find that managed funds cannot be seen 
as substitutes for bank liabilities. In contrast, both instruments seem to complement rather 
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than substitute each other. This result indicates an underlying difference between bank 
deposits and capital-market investment products. 
 
3. Characteristics of the German banking system 
3.1. Institutional characteristics 
 The German banking system is an example of a universal banking system (for a detailed 
description see Hackethal (2004), Brunner et al. (2004) and Fitch Ratings (2005)). 
Accordingly, German banks provide commercial and investment banking services to their 
customers. 
 Historically, three major sectors (or “pillars”) evolved in the German banking system: 
private commercial banks (including the four so-called big banks), public savings banks 
(including the Landesbanks), and credit cooperatives (including the cooperative central 
banks). Note that these three sectors consist of a large number of legally independent banking 
firms; they do not represent banking groups or bank holding companies (but may include 
some). The structure of the banking system mirrors the federalist-decentralized structure of 
politics and economics in Germany. 
 Whereas private commercial banks are relatively heterogeneous in terms of size, 
geographic coverage and activity, the savings banks and credit cooperatives sector are more 
homogenous. These institution are typically relatively small banks that operate regionally and 
focus on deposit taking and lending to SME. In addition, there is a number of private and 
public banks with special functions (mortgage banks, building and loan associations, SME 
finance, development finance etc.). All banks are subject to federal banking regulation and 
supervision. Moreover, deposits at almost all German banks are either directly insured to a 
fixed amount (commercial banks) or indirectly insured by the sector-specific regional and 
federal associations (savings banks, credit cooperatives). Another distinguishing feature is 
that less than 1% of all banks are publicly listed. 
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 The banking system is characterized by a large number of banks as well as bank branches, 
and a small number of inhabitants per bank branch (in 2001: 1,880 inhabitants per branch, in 
2003: 2,113 inhabitants per branch).2 The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) for the German 
banking market is relatively small indicating a low degree of concentration (see Hempell 
(2002), p. 34-35). However, market concentration statistics have to be interpreted carefully: 
the degree of concentration is clearly higher at regional or local levels because most of the 
savings banks and credit cooperatives operate exclusively locally or regionally while some, 
but not all, of the private commercial banks operate in all regions of Germany (for example, 
the four big banks). 
 Finally, two major issues concerning the German banking system are noteworthy. First, 
Germany faces an increasing intra-sector consolidation in the cooperative and savings bank 
sector (see, for example, Elsas (2004)). Table 1 shows characteristics of the German banking 
sector over the period 1992-2003. It reveals that the absolute number of independent banking 
firms has decreased by roughly 43%. This development is mainly due to the growing number 
of mergers in the cooperative sector and, to a smaller degree, in the savings banks sector. In 
addition, the absolute number of domestic bank branches has declined by 25%. Overall, the 
average German bank in 2003 is considerably larger in terms of total assets and number of 
branches than in 1992. 
 
(insert Table 1 here) 
 
 Second, the savings banks sector is in a period of transition because all kinds of public 
guarantees for savings banks and Landesbanks (guarantee obligation, maintenance obligation) 
will be abolished by mid-July 2005 as these guarantees are considered illegal state aids 
                                                 
2 Therefore, Germany has often been called “overbanked” and “overbranched”, see Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2002), Deutsche Bundesbank (2004), and Fitch Ratings (2005). 
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according to European Union law. This development could unfavorably affect the credit 
ratings of the Landesbanks and, as a consequence, raise their funding costs. In contrast, the 
removal of the state guarantees will not have a big impact on savings banks since most of 
their funding consists of (fully-insured) deposits. However, it may influence ownership and 
governance structures towards privatizations as well as cross-sector or cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (see Hackethal (2004), Brunner et al. (2004)). 
 
3.2. Summary statistics 
To investigate the evolution of German banks’ funding modes, we analyze data for all 
German banks from the Deutsche Bundesbank. Major data sources are: 
• Bank balance sheet statistics (publicly available aggregate data, 1970-2002, monthly) 
• Bank balance sheet statistics (not publicly available anonymous bank-level data, 1992-
2002, monthly) 
• Bank income statement statistics (not publicly available anonymous bank-level data, 
1992-2002, yearly) 
 Balance sheet statistics include assets and liabilities items that are disaggregated into 
maturities and creditor/debtor types by economic sectors. In addition, we consider 
performance variables from the yearly income statement statistics. Note that since both 
balance sheet and income statement statistics reflect the entire German banking system, we do 
not have to deal with selection problems and sampling errors. Furthermore, since monthly 
time series are more detailed but simultaneously more noisy (due to seasonal components in 
December and January), monthly observations are only considered for data description in this 
section while section 4 is based on yearly data. Finally, the remaining part of this section is 
based on both aggregate data from the period 1970-2002 and bank-level data from the period 
1992-2002 while the panel analysis in section 4 is carried out with bank-level data from the 
most recent decade. 
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Subsequently, we will summarize the relative evolution of major assets and funding items 
of German banks. Figure 1 displays the development of various asset items of German banks 
over the past 30 years. 
 
(insert Figure 1 here) 
 
The ratio of loans to customers to total assets has decreased from above 60% in the mid-
1980s to below 50% in 2001. Furthermore, interbank lending has slightly increased to 25% 
and security holdings have grown considerably from roughly 10% at the beginning of the 
1980s to more than 20% in 2001. Liquid assets have steadily declined reflecting the 
continuously rising spread of non-cash payment instruments. 
How do German banks fund their investments? Figure 2 presents the evolution of main 
funding items relative to total assets (see also Deutsche Bundesbank (2003), European Central 
Bank (2002)): 
 
(insert Figure 2 here) 
 
It can be seen that the ratio of deposits from customers to total assets has continuously 
declined from 50% to below 40% over the past 15 years. Note that in 1990 the spike in some 
curves is due to the effects of the German unification. During the same period deposits from 
banks (interbank liabilities) have risen from 20% to almost 30% of total assets (see Ehrmann 
and Worms (2001)). In addition, the share of bonds relative to total assets has increased. The 
mean equity ratio of German banks has been quite stable over the last 30 years (see Kleff and 
Weber (2003), and Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003) for recent research on determinants of 
German banks’ capital). 
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The evolution of the ratio deposits from customers to total assets is plotted in Figure 3 by 
major bank categories (big banks, savings banks, credit cooperatives). During the 1990s, we 
detect a clear decrease in deposits from customers relative to total assets for all three bank 
categories (big banks: from 55% in 1990 down to 33% in 2000, savings banks: from 75% 
down to 64%, and cooperatives: from 81% down to 71%). While this decline is dramatic for 
the big banks, it is less pronounced but still remarkable for savings banks and cooperatives. 
Note that this evolution does not necessarily imply that banks’ absolute stock of deposits from 
customers is declining but, at least, that it is growing at a slower rate than other funding items. 
In other words, assets of some banks are increasingly funded by other means than deposits 
from customers. 
 
(insert Figure 3 here) 
 
Additional information on the evolution of deposits from customers is given in Table 2. 
For savings banks (credit cooperatives), the first row indicates an almost monotonous 
reduction in the mean deposit growth rates ∆DEP from 7.3% (9.4%) in 1993 to -0.1% (1.5%) 
in 2000. Deposits rise considerably in 2001 because of reallocations of savings that were 
invested in stocks and mutual funds beforehand (see Deutsche Bundesbank (2003)) but, 
important to note, growth slows down again in 2002. Comparing the growth rates of deposits 
with those of other liabilities which are shown in the second row, it demonstrates that deposits 
at savings banks and cooperatives grow at a slower rate than other liability items in all years 
except 2001 and 2002. The third row displays the first difference of the ratio deposits from 
customers to total assets in percentage points. We find a decline in the relative importance of 
deposits at savings banks and cooperatives in each of the years from 1993 to 2000, except 
2001 and 2002. The fourth row includes the sector-specific share of banks with negative 
growth of the absolute level of deposits. Consistent with the decrease of mean growth rates, 
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the percentage of banks who lose deposits in absolute terms appears to increase over the 
period 1993-2000. For example, 62% of all savings banks and 70% of all cooperatives face a 
net outflow of deposits from customers in the year 2000. In contrast, only a very small 
fraction of savings banks and credit cooperatives exhibit negative deposit growth in 2001. 
Interestingly, the percentage of banks with negative deposit growth has increased strongly 
again in 2002 which is consistent with the above mentioned slackening of average growth 
rates. Finally, we do not see any clear trend for funding modes of “other banks”. There are 
several reasons for this observation. First, since this group is very heterogeneous (including 
the four big banks, the Landesbanks, mortgage banks as well as direct banks or auto banks), 
funding modes differ considerably. Second, deposits are, on average, a less important source 
of funding in this group which is reflected by considerable lower mean deposit ratios than for 
savings banks and credit cooperatives. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the mean fraction of 
banks with negative absolute deposit growth amounts to 32.4% which is the highest mean of 
all groups. 
 
(insert Table 2 here) 
 
This descriptive analysis provides evidence for a substantial change in the funding 
structure of German banks, especially for savings banks and credit cooperatives. In particular, 
it is noteworthy that deposits from customers are no longer as important for funding as in 
former times. As mentioned introduction, this development is not only observed for Germany 
but for other large countries as well. In the next section, a set of hypotheses on the evolution 
of deposits and its consequences is tested by means of micro-data from all German banks over 
the period 1992-2002. 
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4. Analyzing the impact of declining deposit growth 
4.1. Hypotheses 
 Subsequently, we propose three hypotheses that relate to the impact of declining deposit 
growth at German banks. As mentioned in the introduction, note that we take the evolution of 
deposits as reflected in the bank balance sheet statistics as given and analyze its 
consequences. 
 First, in contrast to former banking practice, interbank liabilities might not only serve as a 
temporary buffer for lending-refinancing imbalances but might replace structural funding 
gaps. In Germany, permanent funding with interbank liabilities seems particularly attractive 
for savings banks who can rely on borrowing from their regional Landesbanks while the latter 
refinance themselves by means of bond issuances. Overall, this development implies that 
some banks increasingly become net interbank creditors while others increasingly get net 
interbank debtors. In other words: deposits from customers are gradually substituted by 
borrowed money from other banks. Accordingly, we expect a significantly negative 
relationship between deposits from customers and interbank liabilities. 
H1 (Substitution hypothesis): The declining growth of deposits from customers is 
compensated by an increasing growth of interbank liabilities. 
 
Second, under the condition that the declining growth of deposits cannot be compensated by 
an increase of alternative funding modes, a bank may be forced to reconfigure its asset 
structure (divest from securities or interbank loans to maintain the same lending capacity) 
and/or to reduce growth of lending to customers.3 Hence, we expect a significantly positive 
relationship between deposits from and loans to customers. 
                                                 
3 We cannot follow Berlin and Mester (1999) in analyzing the impact of declining deposit growth on relationship 
lending because our data does not include information on individual bank-borrower relationships. 
 16
H2 (Bottleneck hypothesis): The declining growth of deposits from customers negatively 
affects the growth of lending to customers. 
 
Third, the declining growth of deposits may deteriorate a bank’s performance. Note that in 
Germany, deposits from customers tend to be less expensive than interbank liabilities in terms 
of interest expenses (in particular demand deposits which usually do not pay any or very low 
interest). Therefore, decreasing growth of deposits from customers may reduce the net interest 
income because the new funding mix of a given asset structure will cause higher interest 
expenses. This reasoning only holds if the deposits that are declining in importance bear 
lower interest rates than interbank liabilities. In contrast, if higher interest bearing deposits 
(for example, time deposits or particular savings products) grow at a slower rate, performance 
may be unchanged or even improved. Overall, we expect a significantly positive relationship 
between the relative fraction of deposits from customers to other funding modes and the net 
interest income. 
H3 (Performance impact): The declining growth of deposits will unfavorably affect the 
net interest income of banks. 
 
4.2. Variables and model specifications 
 The variables of our analysis can be categorized as funding items, asset items, 
performance measures as well as bank characteristics and are defined as shown in Table 3. 
Bank characteristics are captured by the variables SIZE (log. of total assets), GROWTH 
(growth rate of total assets), GROUP (categorical variable which is 1 for other banks4, 2 for 
                                                 
4 The group “other banks” includes all private commercial banks as well as Landesbanks (savings bank sector) 
and cooperative central banks (cooperative sector). Although this classification deviates from the three sectors 
mentioned above it seems reasonable as Landesbanks and cooperative central banks are more similar to private 
commercial banks in terms of their business activities and size than to savings banks and credit cooperatives. 
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savings banks, and 3 for credit cooperatives), LOC (indicator variable: 17 regions5), URBAN 
(a dummy variable that takes the value one if a bank stems from the city states of Berlin, 
Hamburg or Bremen6), EAST (a dummy variable that takes the value one if a bank comes 
from Eastern Germany), and MERGE (a dummy variable that is one if a bank acquires 
another bank in a particular year). 
 
(insert Table 3 here) 
 
 Table 4 reports the cross-sectional means of these variables by year as well as the time-
series means for all banks.7 While Panel A includes variable levels as ratios in percent of total 
assets, Panel B presents growth rates of the absolute balance sheet item levels. It can been 
seen from Panel B that the mean of ∆DEP is lower than the one of ∆IBL in each of the years 
except 2001 and 2002. Consequently, the overall mean of ∆DEP amounts to 5.4 % per year 
while it is 13.8 % per year for ∆IBL. A differentiation by deposit types (∆DEM, ∆SAV, 
∆TIME) reveals that the evolution of ∆DEP is quite heterogeneous. While time deposits 
exhibit considerable decreases over 1993-1999, savings deposits increase in the first half of 
the sampling period and decrease in the second half. Demand deposits exhibit on average 
higher growth rates (9.4 %) than savings deposits (7.6 %) and time deposits (-0.4 %). 
 On the asset side, we observe a relatively even increase in lending with ∆LOAN ranging 
between 6% and 11% in most years. The evolution of ∆IBR tends to be irregular: in some 
                                                 
5 Regions are Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, West Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen-
Anhalt, Thüringen, Sachsen, and East Berlin. Except the split up of Berlin in East and West, the regions 
correspond to the German federal states (Bundesländer). 
6 We are aware of the fact the many large cities (for example Munich, Frankfurt, and Cologne) are not covered 
by the variable URBAN. As we do not know the domicile of each bank inside a region, we unfortunately cannot 
mark large cities that are not states. However, differentiating regions by the average number of inhabitants per 
square kilometer over the sampling period leads to a similar classification as by city-states (2,592 
inhabitants/square kilometer) vs. non-city states (225 inhabitants/square kilometer). 
7 See Appendix A for a decomposition by groups and years. 
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years there are increases in interbank receivables while other years exhibit decreases. In terms 
of performance, ∆NIR exhibits a negative mean over the sampling period indicating a general 
deterioration of German banks’ net interest income (see Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (2001)). 
 
(insert Table 4 here) 
 
 We now turn to the specification of regression models to test the three hypotheses 
proposed above. As stated in H1, we examine if and how strong the growth of deposits from 
customers is related to the evolution of other funding modes. The model presented below 
aims to explain the growth rate of interbank liabilities by growth rates of various other 
funding modes. We include slope and intercept dummy variables to identify group-specific 
effects (GROUPj with j=2, 3).8 Additionally, we control for individual bank characteristics 
(MERGEt, EASTt, URBANt, SIZEt, and GROWTHt) and year-specific effects with dummy 
variables (year 1993 as reference category)9. According to H1, the growth of interbank 
liabilities should be inversely related to the growth of deposits from customers, that is β1 < 0. 
In all models, we will substitute ∆DEP with ∆DEM, ∆SAV, and ∆TIME to test whether the 
hypothesis holds for different kinds of deposits and bank groups. 
 
( ) ( )
ittit
itjitjit
dummies_Yearsticscharacteri_Bank
GROUPBONDGROUPDEPIBL
ε+µ+δ
+⋅∆β+⋅∆β+α=∆ 21         (1) 
                                                 
8 Technically, the categorical variable GROUP is decomposed into two dummy variables (GROUPj with j=2: 1 
for savings banks, zero otherwise; GROUPj with j=3: 1 for credit cooperatives, zero otherwise). Hence, other 
banks (j=1) serve as reference category. 
9 Year dummies are included to control for macro-economic effects. We cannot include bank-individual loan and 
deposit interest rates because there is no such micro-data base for German banks. The alternative, i.e. calculating 
average interest rates from interest expenses/income and loan/deposit volume, would be very imprecise because 
it would presume the same level of interest rates for all kinds of deposits. 
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For a test of H2, we analyze the impact of changes in interbank receivables, security holdings 
and various funding modes (in particular interbank liabilities and deposits from customers) on 
changes in lending to customers by means of the following regression model. If H2 holds, we 
would expect a significantly positive coefficient β3 and no significant coefficients β4 and β5. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ittit
itjitjitj
itjitjitjit
dummies_Yearsticscharacteri_Bank
GROUPEQGROUPBONDGROUPIBL
GROUPDEPGROUPSECGROUPIBRLOAN
ε+µ+δ
+⋅∆β+⋅∆β+⋅∆β
+⋅∆β+⋅∆β+⋅∆β+α=∆
654
321
     (2) 
 
Finally, H3 suggests that the relative decline of deposits unfavorably affects a bank’s interest 
income. Consequently, we test whether changes of the funding structure (change rate of the 
ratio of deposits to interbank liabilities, ∆DEP_IBL) influence the net interest income, 
controlling for simultaneous changes of the asset structure (∆LOAN_IBR). Empirical results 
would corroborate H3 if the estimation yields a significantly positive coefficient β1. In 
addition, the coefficients β2 and β3 are also expected to be significantly positive. Note that the 
explanatory variables in this model indicate structural changes on the liability and asset side 
because they measure the change in the reciprocal importance of two variables. 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ittitit
ititit
dummies_Yearsticscharacteri_BankGROUPIBR_LOAN
GROUPBOND_DEPGROUPIBL_DEPNIR
ε+µ+δ+⋅∆β
+⋅∆β+⋅∆β+α=∆
3
21   (3) 
  
with   ∆DEP_IBLt = (DEPt/IBLt) – (DEPt-1/IBLt-1) 
  ∆DEP_BONDt = (DEPt/BONDt) – (DEPt-1/BONDt-1) 
 ∆LOAN_IBRt = (LOANt/IBRt) – (LOANt-1/IBRt-1). 
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As indicated, the three models are estimated in first differences because most of the variable 
levels (i.e. the ratio relative to total assets as well as the absolute balance sheet items) exhibit 
high serial correlation. 
 
4.3. Results 
 In this section, we report and discuss main findings for the regression models 1-3. For 
each model, we present estimation results for cross-sectional time-series pooled data with 
robust standard errors. Note that the corresponding fixed and random effects panel models 
produce very similar outcomes. 
 Table 5 includes results from the estimation of model 1. First of all, keep in mind that 
∆DEMt, ∆SAVt, ∆BONDt, and ∆TIMEt reflect the impact of these variables on ∆IBLt for 
banks from the category “other banks” while interaction terms indicate the additional slope 
coefficients for savings banks (GROUP2 = 1) and credit cooperatives (GROUP3 = 1) 
respectively.10 It can be seen that for other banks ∆DEMt, ∆SAVt, and ∆BONDt are not 
significantly associated with ∆IBLt whereas ∆TIMEt exhibits a significantly negative 
coefficient (-0.20). Interestingly, all interaction terms of ∆DEMt, ∆SAVt, and ∆TIMEt for 
savings banks and credit cooperatives are significantly negative at the 0.01-level. For 
example, a 1%-decline of savings deposits at savings banks (credit cooperatives) translates 
into an overall increase of interbank liabilities by 0.03 + 1.12 = 1.15% (1.04%). In addition, 
results show that the inverse relationship between time deposits and interbank liabilities is 
stronger at cooperatives than at savings banks while the opposite is found for the relationship 
between demand deposits and interbank liabilities. The coefficient of ∆BONDt is only 
significantly negative, but economically weak, when it is interacted with a dummy variable 
for cooperatives. In a modified specification, we also included lag 1 of ∆DEMt, ∆SAVt, 
                                                 
10 The same interpretation applies to models 2 and 3. 
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∆TIMEt, and ∆BONDt and find that none of the coefficients is significantly different from 
zero. Moreover, the dummy variable MERGEt is significantly negative which may be due to 
the fact that interbank liabilities of the (usually bigger) acquirer may be diluted due to a 
smaller interbank liabilities of the (usually smaller) target. The indicator variable EASTt has a 
significantly negative impact on ∆IBLt but its magnitude is much smaller than the that of 
MERGEt. GROWTHt and the corresponding interaction terms are significantly positive 
indicating that an increase in total assets is, at least, partially funded by an increase in 
interbank liabilities. The additive group dummy variables are highly significant and positive 
reflecting the higher growth of interbank liabilities at savings banks and cooperatives 
compared to other banks. Finally, the model explains roughly one third of the variation of 
changes in interbank liabilities which is relatively high for a regression in first-differences. In 
summary, a significant negative relationship between all kinds of deposits from customers 
and interbank liabilities has been detected for savings banks, credit cooperatives, and partly 
for other banks which provides support for hypothesis H1. 
 
(insert Table 5 here) 
 
 We now turn to the test of H2 by means of regression model 2. Table 6 summarizes the 
estimation results. First, we find that changes of interbank receivables (∆IBRt) exhibit a 
significantly negative coefficient indicating substitution relationships between different types 
of bank assets. Although the influence is less pronounced for savings banks and cooperatives 
due to significantly positive interaction terms, the overall effect remains significant and 
negative for all bank groups. Changes in security holdings (∆SECt) have a significantly 
negative impact on loan growth at all banks. The interaction terms for savings banks and 
cooperatives are not significant indicating that there is no difference in the slope coefficients 
in comparison to the reference group. 
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 Second, changes of interbank liabilities (∆IBLt) exhibit no significant impact on the 
growth rate of loans to customers at either bank group. Similarly, demand deposits have no 
significant impact while savings deposits at other banks and savings banks (but not at 
cooperatives) are significantly positively related to the growth of loans. However, in terms of 
economic significance, the relationship is quite weak with coefficients between 0.0271 and 
0.0722 (= 0.0271 + 0.0451). For time deposits, we obtain a significantly positive coefficient 
for other banks, no significant additional slope for savings banks but a significantly negative 
coefficient for cooperatives. ∆BONDt exhibits overall coefficients that are significant at the 
0.10-level but their magnitude is even lower than those of most kinds of deposits. Changes of 
a bank’s equity ratio have a significantly positive influence on ∆LOANt at all bank groups, 
especially at savings banks. Moreover, MERGEt and in particular EASTt exert a strong 
positive impact on loan growth. The significantly negative coefficient of SIZEt indicates that 
larger banks exhibit a slower growth of loans to customers. Finally, GROWTHt is highly 
significant and positively associated with ∆LOANt with an economically meaningful 
coefficient of 0.9691. 
 
(insert Table 6 here) 
 
 Although we have detected a positive impact of ∆SAVt and ∆TIMEt as well as no 
significant influence of ∆IBLt on ∆LOANt, we refrain from concluding that these empirical 
findings provide clear-cut support for H2. Such a conclusion would ignore that there is 
simultaneously a significantly positive impact of ∆BONDt and a negative link between asset 
items (loans to customers, interbank receivables, security holdings). Consequently, even if 
deposits are declining in relative importance, a reconfiguration on the asset side or other 
funding modes could substitute this funding gap enabling a bank to maintain or even increase 
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its capacity of lending to customers. Overall, we have to reject hypothesis H2: apparently, 
there is no “bottleneck” or negative effect on lending due to a relative decline in deposits from 
customers. 
 Finally, we investigate if and how structural changes in banks’ funding modes affect bank 
profitability measured by changes of the ratio net interest income to total assets (∆NIRt). 
Table 7 reveals that the ratio of deposits from customers to interbank liabilities (∆DEP_IBLt) 
has no significant influence in the case of other banks and credit cooperatives while its 
coefficient is significantly positive at the 0.01-level for savings banks. In other words: the 
higher the share of deposits from customers relative to interbank liabilities the more profitable 
a savings bank.11 Moreover, changes of the ratio of loans to customers to interbank 
receivables (∆LOAN_IBRt) exhibit a significantly positive impact on ∆NIRt for all bank 
groups. Note that the effect is less marked for savings banks (credit cooperatives) which is 
reflected by a significantly negative interaction term of -0.07 (-0.05). The overall coefficient 
of ∆LOAN_IBRt is highest for other banks (0.0918) and lowest for savings banks (0.0217). 
One explanation could be that other banks benefit from higher margins in loan rates than 
savings banks due to a more risk-sensitive loan pricing behavior. Furthermore, there is no 
significant interest income impact of structural shifts between deposits and bonds 
(∆DEP_BONDt) in either bank group. In addition, the coefficient of MERGEt is highly 
significant and amounts to 0.17 which can be directly interpreted as an additional net interest 
income (in percentage points) for the acquirer in the year of a bank merger/acquisition. The 
                                                 
11 We admit that this finding only holds for the net interest result of savings banks but not for overall 
profitability. In general, there may be two contrarian effects. On the one hand, it is not implausible to assume 
that a savings bank pushes its customers to invest, for example, in mutual funds to generate provision income 
which may reduce growth of deposits. On the other hand, if the same bank faces a steady growth in loan demand, 
it has to find alternative funding modes which might be more expensive than previous ones. It is left to future 
research whether additional provision income exceeds increased funding costs caused by an altered funding 
structure. The data analyzed here does not allow to study this issue as we cannot isolate provision income that is 
due to the sale of investment funds. In addition, note that the average net interest result of savings banks is five 
times larger than the net non-interest result during the sampling period. 
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variables EASTt, SIZEt, and GROWTHt display significantly negative coefficients while 
URBANt has no significant influence.  
 
(insert Table 7 here) 
 
 To summarize, consistent with the prediction of Hackethal (2004), we find evidence in 
favor of H3 for German savings banks: a decrease in deposits from customers, which is 
compensated by an increase in interbank borrowing, unfavorably affects the net interest result. 
Note that our regression results are based on years with relatively high interest rates (and an 
inverse term structure that is shifting to a normal one) during 1992-1993 and years with 
relatively low interest rates (and a normal term structure) during the last years. While year 
dummies (not shown in Table 7) are not significant in each of the years for other banks except 
1994, they exhibit significantly positive coefficients for savings banks during most of the 
years, and significantly negative coefficients for credit cooperatives in all years. The 
significance and the magnitude of the year dummies reflect the different impact of the level 
and term structure of interest rates on each group which is caused by different asset and 
funding structures. 
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5.  Conclusions 
 In this analysis, we examine structural changes of funding modes and its implications for 
lending to customers and bank profitability. Empirical evidence is based on individual data 
from all German banks for the period 1992-2002 provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 First, we find that deposits from customers decline and interbank liabilities increase in 
relative importance as a source of funding. Thus, we provide evidence for a kind of “creeping 
disintermediation” (or, at least, lengthening of the intermediation chain) on the liability side 
of bank balance sheets. Second, we cannot detect a negative impact of the relative decline in 
deposits on lending to customers. Instead, lending is even slightly gaining in relative 
importance over time. Third, the decreasing ability of banks to mobilize deposits from 
customers and the substitution of deposits by interbank liabilities unfavorably affects the net 
interest results of German savings banks. 
 What are the implications of our analysis for Germany and other countries which exhibit a 
similar evolution of bank funding modes? First, the data from German banks shows that the 
function of deposits matters. On the one hand, following demand-side arguments, we 
conclude that demand deposits are and will not be affected by disintermediation because they 
provide liquidity and serve as means of payment (see Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) and 
Bossone (2001)). Demand deposits are exclusively provided by banks and represent a 
significant feature of banks’ specialness. Additionally, supply-side arguments suggest that 
demand deposits provide the bank with information that can be used for monitoring purposes 
(see Black (1975), Fama (1985), Nakamura (1993), and Mester, Nakamura, and Renault 
(2003)). Accordingly, there may be an informational synergy between deposit taking (and 
payment services) and lending. On the other hand, financial products fullfill an investment 
and/or saving function. These products are offered by banks (savings deposits, time deposits), 
non-bank financial intermediaries (e.g. insurance companies, mutual funds) and financial 
markets (stocks, bonds). Our data indicates that savings deposits steadily decrease in relative 
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importance which leads to structural changes in bank funding modes and to a lengthening of 
the intermediation chain for investment products. Second, given the relative change of 
funding structures and the simultaneous growth in lending there is a strategic need for 
alternative funding modes. It is obvious that long-term funding by demand deposits will by 
far not be sufficient and interbank funding will reach its limits. We think that true sale asset 
securitization, which still is in its infancy in Germany, is not only useful for risk management 
purposes but can also represent one possible instrument to deal with strategic imbalances 
between the lending and deposit business of banks. Finally, central banks and banking 
supervisors should monitor the long-run evolution of national and cross-border interbank 
relationships and its impact on systemic liquidity and credit risk. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics by group and year 
 
 
Other banks 
 
Panel A: Mean variable levels (in %) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
IBL 33.1 31.1 30.2 28.9 28.8 29.7 27.2 29.2 29.2 26.9 25.9 29.4
DEP 44.7 46.8 46.8 47.1 48.1 48.0 50.8 49.1 48.3 51.8 52.2 48.2
DEM 8.5 8.8 9.4 10.2 12.7 12.3 14.6 14.1 13.9 16.8 17.9 12.3
SAV 8.6 9.4 10.0 10.2 10.8 11.4 11.2 10.8 9.4 9.4 9.5 10.0
TIME 27.56 28.6 27.4 26.7 24.5 24.2 25.1 24.2 25.0 25.6 24.7 25.9
BOND 7.1 7.4 8.1 8.8 8.3 7.7 7.4 7.0 7.3 6.7 6.7 7.5
EQRAT 6.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.0 6.4 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.6 6.5
IBR 30.6 31.0 28.6 29.5 29.8 30.5 31.3 29.8 26.3 27.4 27.4 29.4
LOAN 48.8 47.9 49.3 49.0 48.7 48.6 47.86 47.5 50.6 50.2 50.0 48.9
SEC 10.9 12.6 13.7 13.0 13.4 13.4 13.4 15.0 15.1 15.3 15.5 13.6
NIR 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1
SIZE 13.5 13.7 13.8 13.8 13.9 13.9 13.9 14.0 14.0 14.1 14.2 13.9
GROWTH --- 15.3 4.9 8.0 9.1 9.9 8.7 99.5 6.6 12.2 7.6 17.6
EAST 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.4
MERGE 0.0 2.7 1.1 0.6 2.4 1.8 2.6 2.1 1.4 3.0 --- 1.7
 
Panel B: Mean variable change rates (in %) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
∆IBL --- 6.5 2.4 2.2 8.8 12.8 -2.5 21.4 -2.2 3.9 -0.6 5.4
∆DEP --- 13.6 4.4 7.7 7.5 5.5 8.7 9.4 -1.1 10.8 2.1 6.9
∆DEM --- 11.3 5.1 11.9 22.4 1.0 15.9 14.4 -2.8 31.4 8.4 11.7
∆SAV --- 3.9 1.0 9.9 2.6 -2.1 4.8 4.2 -24.9 -2.0 -9.5 0.8
∆TIME --- 9.4 -0.1 3.7 3.8 6.4 5.5 10.1 5.4 5.5 -1.7 4.8
∆BOND --- 14.2 21.2 13.3 13.9 -7.43 2.2 -6.4 -9.5 5.3 -24.2 4.6
∆EQ --- 9.9 8.1 5.1 6.2 5.9 7.1 9.4 5.4 9.1 8.5 7.5
∆IBR --- 19.2 -7.4 18.7 9.0 12.9 13.7 -9.0 -10.3 9.1 1.4 6.1
∆LOAN --- 10.9 4.9 7.4 7.8 6.1 5.1 9.5 7.8 4.5 -0.2 6.5
∆SEC --- 17.7 14.8 -0.2 2.3 7.4 2.0 24.0 4.5 9.8 -4.6 8.1
∆NIR --- 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.0
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Appendix A (continued): Descriptive statistics by group and year 
 
 
Savings banks 
 
Panel C: Mean variable levels (in %) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
IBL 12.4 13.5 15.6 16.4 17.4 18.7 19.9 22.1 23.8 22.5 21.9 18.4
DEP 74.0 74.1 71.2 69.5 68.3 67.1 66.2 64.4 62.4 63.8 64.1 68.0
DEM 11.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.9 13.5 14.0 14.4 14.7 16.9 17.7 14.6
SAV 34.2 34.5 36.0 37.7 38.8 38.5 37.6 36.4 34.0 33.2 33.0 35.9
TIME 28.0 24.4 20.8 17.9 15.6 15.0 14.6 13.6 13.7 13.7 13.4 17.5
BOND 4.9 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.8
EQRAT 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.9
IBR 8.3 11.1 7.4 8.2 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.0 6.5 7.1 8.1 7.9
LOAN 62.0 53.8 56.4 58.3 59.0 59.5 59.5 59.9 60.6 60.1 60.1 58.8
SEC 21.8 25.4 27.8 25.7 25.9 26.1 26.4 26.2 26.1 26.1 25.1 25.7
NIR 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.5
SIZE 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.6 13.7 13.7 13.8 13.8 13.9 14.0 14.0 13.7
GROWTH --- 11.0 11.8 10.1 8.2 5.9 5.8 5.7 3.9 5.7 2.0 7.2
EAST 0.0 24.2 21.1 17.3 6.0 15.7 15.8 15.6 16.0 16.8 17.3 16.3
MERGE 0.0 2.6 5.6 3.8 2.3 1.2 0.7 2.1 2.3 3.7 --- 2.5
 
Panel D: Mean variable change rates (in %) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
∆IBL --- 20.9 25.7 14.3 13.9 13.0 12.8 15.5 11.1 -1.0 -0.9 12.9
∆DEP --- 7.5 6.5 6.4 5.6 3.6 4.2 2.2 -0.0 6.9 2.1 4.6
∆DEM --- 9.6 8.5 7.9 9.2 3.6 9.6 8.2 4.8 18.0 5.6 8.5
∆SAV --- 10.7 14.2 13.6 10.1 4.6 3.0 1.5 -3.7 2.1 0.8 5.9
∆TIME --- 2.3 -6.9 -8.6 -7.7 1.4 2.1 -2.1 3.6 4.2 -1.4 -1.5
∆BOND --- 5.5 12.0 12.7 2.7 1.2 -9.4 -12.9 -4.4 -3.8 -4.0 0.1
∆EQ --- 8.9 10.6 9.9 9.1 8.0 6.6 7.1 6.8 6.8 5.0 8.0
∆IBR --- 22.5 -39.1 24.6 1.5 2.1 5.9 -0.4 -13.8 24.2 11.7 3.2
∆LOAN --- 8.3 14.2 10.5 7.8 6.4 5.8 5.8 4.7 4.4 2.1 7.2
∆SEC --- 14.6 21.4 1.1 8.5 5.7 5.1 4.8 1.7 2.2 -5.7 6.2
∆NIR --- 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
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Appendix A (continued): Descriptive statistics by group and year 
 
 
Credit cooperatives 
 
Panel E: Mean variable levels (in %) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
IBL 7.5 8.5 9.8 10.8 11.3 12.0 12.9 14.3 14.8 13.8 13.1 11.3
DEP 83.1 81.7 79.7 78.3 77.5 76.6 75.8 74.3 73.1 74.2 74.3 77.7
DEM 13.0 13.8 13.7 13.4 13.9 13.9 14.6 15.4 15.7 17.7 18.5 14.6
SAV 32.8 31.6 34.1 37.1 40.0 40.8 40.2 39.1 36.7 35.1 34.7 36.5
TIME 37.3 36.3 32.0 27.7 23.7 22.0 21.0 19.8 20.7 21.4 21.1 26.6
BOND 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.1
EQRAT 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.7
IBR 15.0 16.0 12.6 13.5 12.7 12.7 12.9 12.8 11.3 12.8 13.3 13.3
LOAN 58.2 55.4 57.2 58.5 59.0 59.9 60.3 60.6 62.9 61.1 60.6 59.1
SEC 19.2 20.7 23.0 21.1 21.7 21.2 20.8 20.3 19.3 19.2 19.4 20.7
NIR 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.9
SIZE 11.1 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 12.1 12.2 11.6
GROWTH --- 12.1 9.7 8.4 7.0 5.5 8.0 6.8 4.5 9.1 5.1 7.8
EAST 0.0 7.7 7.3 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.2
MERGE 0.0 3.7 3.6 2.4 2.6 3.0 5.3 7.6 9.9 7.8 --- 4.2
 
Panel F: Mean variable change rates (in %) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
∆IBL --- 21.6 25.6 18.9 13.5 12.7 16.1 17.9 7.7 0.9 -1.7 14.7
∆DEP --- 9.4 6.4 5.8 5.4 3.6 5.8 3.7 1.5 8.6 4.2 5.6
∆DEM --- 9.6 8.9 6.0 9.5 4.9 13.4 11.4 5.8 19.3 8.3 9.4
∆SAV --- 10.4 16.6 16.5 14.6 7.2 5.4 3.3 -2.9 2.4 3.0 8.6
∆TIME --- 8.4 -4.5 -7.9 -10.5 -3.2 2.5 -0.9 6.4 10.6 1.4 -0.5
∆BOND --- 27.7 24.1 22.2 5.8 7.1 1.1 0.3 7.2 1.7 8.8 11.5
∆EQ --- 12.5 12.5 10.4 10.2 8.1 8.0 7.8 9.2 6.2 5.7 9.4
∆IBR --- 17.6 -21.5 19.4 -1.0 6.1 11.4 4.2 -10.9 24.9 8.4 5.4
∆LOAN --- 9.1 11.7 9.9 7.2 6.3 7.4 6.1 6.7 4.2 3.0 7.6
∆SEC --- 15.1 21.2 -2.6 7.4 1.6 4.6 2.4 -2.0 3.6 1.5 5.9
∆NIR --- 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
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Table 1: Characteristics of the German banking sector 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total assets 
(mill. EUR) 
3,141 3,476 3,684 3,977 4,366 4,789 5,294 5,678 6,084 6,303 6,394 6,432
Nb. of  
banks 
4,030 3,866 3,701 3,616 3,508 3,415 3,232 2,993 2,733 2,518 2,419 2,294
Nb. of savings 
banks 
723 704 657 626 607 598 594 578 562 534 519 489
Nb. of credit 
cooperatives 
2,916 2,774 2,664 2,589 2,508 2,419 2,249 2,035 1,795 1,621 1,490 1,394
Nb. of all  
bank branches* 
49,186 49,118 48,721 48,224 47,741 47,086 45,227 44,443 43,307 41,297 38,201 36,599
* This number does not include branches of the Postbank AG, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2004). 
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Table 2: Evolution of deposits from customers and other liabilities 
This table reports the mean annual growth rates of deposits from customers ∆DEP in %, the mean annual growth 
rate of other liabilities ∆(other liab.) in %, the mean change of relative levels ∆(DEP/TA) in percentage points, 
and the percentage of banks with negative growth rates of deposits from customers by groups and years. The last 
column shows the mean of each variable over the period 1993-2002. 
 
Group Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
Savings ∆DEP 7.3 6.5 6.4 5.6 3.6 4.2 2.3 -0.1 6.9 2.1 4.6
banks ∆(other liab.) 15.8 22.5 14.2 11.2 10.2 9.6 11.9 9.5 -0.7 -0.7 10.7
 ∆(DEP/TA) -1.8 -2.6 -1.5 -1.1 -1.2 -0.9 -1.8 -2.0 1.2 0.2 -1.2
 percentage with 
∆DEP < 0 
0.3 11.9 8.4 5.4 13.4 6.1 31.5 62.4 3.2 29.6 16.9
Credit ∆DEP 9.4 6.4 5.8 5.4 3.6 5.8 3.7 1.5 8.7 4.2 5.5
cooperatives ∆(other liab.) 21.1 23.9 18.8 11.7 11.5 13.1 14.8 7.6 1.1 0.2 13.6
 ∆(DEP/TA) -1.2 -1.8 -1.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.7 -1.4 -1.2 1.2 0.2 -0.9
 percentage with 
∆DEP < 0 
2.4 10.2 8.2 9.4 23.1 15.0 42.3 70.1 6.4 32.2 19.9
Other ∆DEP 14.6 2.9 7.3 9.2 5.9 10.0 6.5 -0.6 9.5 1.9 6.9
banks ∆(other liab.) 2.2 3.1 4.7 5.1 6.6 2.2 17.2 5.8 -0.9 -4.4 4.3
 ∆(DEP/TA) 0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 1.3 -0.9 -1.5 1.4 0.4 0.1
 percentage with 
∆DEP < 0 
18.7 45.5 29.7 26.3 35.2 27.2 32.6 43.3 22.7 45.2 32.4
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Table 3: Variable categories and definitions 
Variable category Variable Definition 
Funding items IBL interbank liabilities 
 DEP deposits from customers 
 DEM demand deposits from customers 
 SAV savings deposits from customers 
 TIME time deposits from customers 
 BOND bonds 
 EQ equity 
 EQRAT equity / (total assets) 
Asset items IBR interbank receivables 
 LOAN loans to customers 
 SEC securities holdings 
Bank performance NIR (net interest income) / (total assets) 
Bank characteristics SIZE log (total assets) 
 GROWTH log [(total assets in t) / (total assets in t-1)] 
 GROUP sector (other banks, savings banks, and credit cooperatives) 
 LOC location (16 regions in Germany) 
 URBAN city region (dummy, 1 if bank stems from Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen) 
 EAST Eastern Germany (dummy, 1 if bank stems from Eastern Germany) 
 MERGE bank is involved in a merger as an acquirer (dummy) 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by year 
Panel A: Mean variables relative to total assets (in %) and bank characteristics 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
IBL 9.7 10.6 11.9 12.7 13.3 14.2 14.9 16.7 17.7 16.6 16.0 13.7
DEP 79.4 78.4 76.4 75.1 74.3 73.3 72.6 70.9 69.2 70.4 70.5 74.2
DEM 12.6 13.8 13.6 13.4 13.8 13.7 14.5 15.1 15.4 17.4 18.2 14.4
SAV 31.6 31.0 33.1 35.8 38.3 38.8 38.2 37.0 34.5 33.1 32.8 34.9
TIME 35.2 33.6 29.6 25.8 22.2 20.7 19.9 18.7 19.3 19.8 19.4 24.8
BOND 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.7
EQRAT 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.2 4.6
IBR 14.8 15.9 12.4 13.3 12.7 12.6 12.7 12.5 11.10 12.3 12.9 13.1
LOAN 58.2 54.7 56.6 57.9 58.5 59.2 59.5 59.8 61.7 60.3 59.8 58.5
SEC 19.1 21.2 23.4 21.6 22.1 21.7 21.6 21.3 20.6 20.6 20.6 21.3
NIR 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.8
SIZE 11.6 11.8 11.9 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.1
GROWTH --- 12.1 9.8 8.7 7.3 5.8 7.6 11.4 4.5 8.5 4.5 8.2
EAST 10.9 10.5 9.5 8.6 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.9
MERGE 0.0 3.3 3.8 2.5 2.6 2.6 4.3 6.2 7.7 6.6 --- 3.7
 
Panel B: Mean variable changes (in %) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
∆IBL --- 20.7 24.3 17.1 13.4 12.7 14.3 17.5 7.9 0.6 -1.5 13.8
∆DEP --- 9.3 6.2 5.9 5.6 3.7 5.7 3.5 1.0 8.3 3.5 5.4
∆DEM --- 9.7 8.6 6.6 10.0 4.5 12.7 10.8 5.4 19.6 7.5 9.4
∆SAV --- 9.9 15.4 15.5 13.1 6.2 4.9 2.8 -4.2 2.1 1.8 7.6
∆TIME --- 7.5 -4.8 -7.5 -9.1 -1.8 2.6 -0.8 5.6 8.7 0.6 -0.4
∆BOND --- 20.3 20.7 19.1 5.3 4.5 -2.3 -4.5 2.1 -0.1 2.4 7.6
∆EQRAT --- 11.7 11.7 10.1 9.5 7.9 7.8 7.7 8.4 6.5 5.7 8.9
∆IBR --- 18.4 -24.1 20.1 -0.1 5.7 10.2 2.6 -11.5 23.8 8.7 4.9
∆LOAN --- 9.1 11.7 9.7 7.4 6.3 7.0 6.2 6.3 4.2 2.4 7.4
∆SEC --- 15.1 20.7 -1.7 7.4 2.5 4.5 3.8 -0.9 3.5 -0.5 6.1
∆NIR --- 0.0. 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
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Table 5: Regression results for ∆IBL 
Results are based on a cross-sectional time-series pooled estimation with data from all banks for the period 1993-
2001. Dummy variables GROUP2 (1 for savings banks, 0 otherwise) and GROUP3 (1 for credit cooperatives, 0 
otherwise) are added and interacted with ∆DEM, ∆SAV, ∆TIME, ∆BOND, and GROWTH. Additionally, the 
regression includes year dummies (1993 as reference category) that are not shown here. *** , **, * indicate 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level. P-values are calculated 
from robust standard errors. 
 
∆IBLt Coeff. p-val.
∆DEMt -0.0897 0.142  
(∆DEMt*GROUP2) -0.5341 0.000 *** 
(∆DEMt*GROUP3) -0.2776 0.002 *** 
∆SAVt -0.0381 0.141  
(∆SAVt*GROUP2) -1.1224 0.000 *** 
(∆SAVt*GROUP3) -1.0009 0.000 *** 
∆TIMEt -0.2020 0.001 *** 
(∆TIMEt*GROUP2) -0.3169 0.000 *** 
(∆TIMEt*GROUP3) -0.6209 0.000 *** 
∆BONDt -0.0005 0.987  
(∆BONDt*GROUP2) -0.0353 0.300  
(∆BONDt*GROUP3) -0.0627 0.064 * 
MERGEt -12.0282 0.000 *** 
EAST -5.8477 0.000 *** 
URBAN 1.6493 0.638  
SIZEt 0.5874 0.056 * 
GROWTHt 1.3376 0.000 *** 
(GROWTHt*GROUP2) 2.3647 0.000 *** 
(GROWTHt*GROUP3) 2.3294 0.000 *** 
GROUP2 5.6267 0.001 *** 
GROUP3 6.6746 0.000 *** 
Constant -13.3423 0.012 ** 
Obs. 15,094
R2 overall 0.2895
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Table 6: Regression results for ∆LOAN 
Results are based on a cross-sectional time-series pooled estimation with data from all banks for the period 1993-
2001. Dummy variables GROUP2 (1 for savings banks, 0 otherwise) and GROUP3 (1 for credit cooperatives, 0 
otherwise) are added and interacted with ∆IBR, ∆SEC, ∆DEM, ∆SAV, ∆TIME, ∆BOND, and GROWTH. 
Additionally, the regression includes year dummies (1993 as reference category) that are not shown here. *** , **, 
* indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level. P-values are 
calculated from robust standard errors. 
 
∆LOANt Coeff. p-val.
∆IBRt -0.1318 0.000 ***
(∆IBRt*GROUP2) 0.1110 0.000 ***
(∆IBRt*GROUP3) 0.0901 0.002 ***
∆SECt -0.0781 0.001 ***
(∆SECt*GROUP2) 0.0044 0.876
(∆SECt*GROUP3) 0.0179 0.489
∆IBLt -0.0053 0.691
(∆IBLt*GROUP2) -0.0124 0.410
(∆IBLt*GROUP3) 0.0141 0.298
∆DEMt 0.0068 0.759
(∆DEMt*GROUP2) -0.0090 0.697
(∆DEMt*GROUP3) -0.0105 0.640
∆SAVt 0.0271 0.057 *
(∆SAVt*GROUP2) 0.0451 0.031 **
(∆SAVt*GROUP3) -0.0166 0.318
∆TIMEt 0.0587 0.076 *
(∆TIMEt*GROUP2) -0.0490 0.145
(∆TIMEt*GROUP3) -0.0679 0.043 **
∆BONDt 0.0405 0.069 *
(∆BONDt*GROUP2) -0.0377 0.090 *
(∆BONDt*GROUP3) -0.0372 0.094 *
∆EQRATt 1.6172 0.012 **
(∆EQRATt*GROUP2) 1.6306 0.059 *
(∆EQRATt*GROUP3) 0.0678 0.930
MERGEt 1.6852 0.000 ***
EAST 2.6511 0.000 ***
URBAN 1.4137 0.009 ***
SIZEt -0.2386 0.000 ***
GROWTHt 0.9691 0.000 ***
(GROWTHt*GROUP2) 0.0633 0.683
(GROWTHt*GROUP3) 0.0765 0.615
GROUP2 0.0798 0.921
GROUP3 -0.4173 0.588
Constant 2.1260 0.043 **
Obs. 15,077
R2 overall 0.7915
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Table 7: Regression results for ∆NIR (all banks) 
Results are based on a cross-sectional time-series pooled estimation with data from all banks for the period 1993-
2001. Dummy variables GROUP2 (1 for savings banks, 0 otherwise) and GROUP3 (1 for credit cooperatives, 0 
otherwise) are added and interacted with ∆DEP_IBL, ∆DEP_BOND, and ∆LOAN_IBR. Additionally, the 
regression includes year dummies (1993 as reference category) that are not shown here. *** , **, * indicate 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level. P-values are calculated 
from robust standard errors. 
 
∆NIRt Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.  
∆DEP_IBLt 0.0108 0.734  0.0097   
(∆DEP_IBLt*GROUP2) 0.0932 0.008 *** 0.0961   
(∆DEP_IBLt*GROUP3) 0.0194 0.583  0.0216   
∆DEP_BONDt -0.0102 0.459  -0.0120   
(∆DEP_BONDt*GROUP2) 0.0026 0.863  0.0044   
(∆DEP_BONDt*GROUP3) 0.0205 0.153  0.0224   
∆LOAN_IBRt 0.0918 0.002 *** 0.0829   
(∆LOAN_IBRt*GROUP2) -0.0701 0.019 ** -0.0609   
(∆LOAN_IBRt*GROUP3) -0.0524 0.080 * -0.0432   
MERGEt 0.1789 0.000 *** 0.1695   
EAST -0.0361 0.000 *** -0.0360   
URBAN -0.0054 0.694  -0.0064   
SIZEt -0.0053 0.002 *** -0.0049   
GROWTHt -0.0053 0.000 *** -0.0064   
GROUP2 -0.0326 0.002 *** -0.0421   
GROUP3 -0.0317 0.006 *** -0.0416   
Constant 0.0162 0.571  0.0204   
Obs. 15,085   
R2 overall 0.2105   
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Figure 1: Asset items to total assets of all German banks (in %) 
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Figure 2: Funding items to total assets of all German banks (in %) 
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Figure 3: Deposits from customers to total assets by bank categories (in %) 
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